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'From: D. Pearce and G. Wagner (eds.), Logic~ in AI, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 653,
Springer, Berlin, 1992, 52 - 64. I would like to thank Ed Keenan and Heinrich Wansing for comments
and crïticisms.
Reinhard Muskens
Logical Omniscience and Classical Logic~
1 LogicalOmniscience
Let us call two expressions synonymous if and only if they may be inter-
changed in each sentence without altering the truth value of that sentence.'
With the help of an argumeni by Benson Mates (Mates [1950]) it can be
shown that synonymy is a very strong relation indeed. Consider, for ex-
ample, the following two sentences.
(1) Everybody believes that whcever thinks that all Greeks are
courageous thinks that all Greeks are courageous
(2) Everybody believes that whcever thinks that all Greeks are
courageous thinks that all Hellenes are courageous
Some philosophers indeed believe that whoever thinks that all Greeks are
courageous also thinks ihat all Hellenes are courageous.2 But certainly not
everyone agrees, and so (2) is false. We may assume, on the other hand,
that (1) is true, and since (1) can be obtained from (2) by replacing
`Hellenes' by `Greeks', the latter two words are not synonymous. By a
similar procedure any pair of words thai are normally declared synonyms
can be shown not to be synonymous after all, if our definition of the term
is accepted.
Worse, it seems that the relation of synonymy is even stronger than the
relation of logical equivalence is. Sentences that are normally accepted to
t From: D. Pearce and G. Wagner (eds.), Logics in AI, Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence 633, Springer, Berlin, 1992, 52-64. I would like to thank Ed Keenan and
Heinrich Wansing for comments and criticisms.
t This essentially is Mates's [1950] formulation of the interchangeability principle.
Note how close Mates's formulation is to Leibniz's:
Eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alten salva ventate.
2 E.g. Putnam in Putnam [1954].
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be logically equivalent need not be synonymous. Suppose3 Jones wants to
enter a building that has three doors, A, B, and C. The distances between
any two of these doors are equal. Jones wants to get in as quickly as possi-
ble, without making detours and he knows that if A is locked B is not.
Now, if our agent tries to open door B first and finds it locked there might
be a moment of hesitation. The reasonable thing for Jones is to walk to A,
since if B is locked A is not, but he may need some time to infer this. This
contrasts with the case in which he tries A first, since if he cannot open
this door he will walk to B without further ado. The point ís that one ma}~
well fail to realize (momentarily) that a sentence is true, even when one
knows the contrapositive to hold. For a moment (3) might be true while
(4) is false.
(3) Jones knows that if A is locked B is not locked
(4) Jones knows that if B is locked A is not locked
It follows that the two embedded sentences are not synonymous, even
though logically equivalent on the usual account.
All reasoning takes time. This means that
(~ Jones knows that q~
need not imply
(6) Jones knows that ~
even if q~ and y~ are logically equivalent. If the embedded sentences are
syntactically distinct then, since Jones needs time to make the relevant in-
ference, there will always be a moment at which (5) is true but (6) is still
false.
Of course, the easier it is to deduce ~ty from cp, the shorter this time span
will be and the harder it is to imagine that Jones knows q~ without realiz-
ing that ~. We ascribe to Jones certain capacities for reasoning, even if we
do not grant him logical omniscience. For instance, if Jones knov;-s A and
B, then it is hard to imagine that he would fail to know B and A as v~~ell.
3 This example is adapted from Moore [1989].
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But even here there may be a split-second where the necessary calculation
has yet to be made. Therefore `Jones knows B and A' does not follow
from `Jones knows A and B'.
A real problem results if we try to formalise the logic of the verb to
know and its like. All ordinary logics (including modal logics) allow logi-
cal equivalents to be interchanged, but epistemic contexts do not admit
such replacements. It thus may seem that the logic of the propositional
attitude verbs is very much out of the ordinary and that we must find a
logic that dces not support full interchangeability of equivalents if we
want our theory of the propositional attitudes to fit the facts.
Systems that do not admit replacement of equivalents do in fact exist.
For example Rantala [1982a, 1982b], working out ideas of Montague
[1970], Cresswell [1972] and Hintikka [1975], offers an `impossible
world semantics' for modal logic in which the interchangeability property
fails. In the next section I'll criticise Rantala's system for not being a
logic in the strict sense, but I think that its main underlying idea, the idea
that we can use `impossible' worlds to obtain a very fine grained notion of
meaning, is important and useful. Despite appearances however, this idea
is compatible with classical logic and in section 4 I shall show in some
detail how we can use impossible worlds to treat the propositional atti-
tudes without resorting to a non-standard logic. The logic that I shall use
is the classical type theory of Church [1940]. Section 3 will be devoted to
a short exposition of this logic for the convenience of those readers ~ti~ho
are not already familiar with it.
2 Rantala Models for Modal Logic
The basic idea behind Rantala's interpretation of the language of proposi-
tional modal logic is to add a set of so-called impossible (or: non-normal)
worlds to the usual Kripke frames. Equivalence can then be defined with
respect to possible worlds only, but for interchangeability the impossible
ones come into play as well. The net result will be that equivalents need
not be interchangeable in the scope of the epistemic operator ~.
Formally, a Rantala model for the language of propositional modal
logic is a tuple (IV, I~, R, ~ consisting of a non-empty set W of possible
worlds, a set W~` of impossible worlds, a relation R C (W U W~`)2, and a
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two-place valuation function V: FoRM x( W U W~`) ~{0,1 } such that for
a11wEW:
(i) V(~q~, w) - 1 iff V(cp, w) - 0
(ii) V(q~ n y~, w) - 1 iff V(q~, w) - 1 and V(~, w) - 1
(iii) V((] cp, w) - 1 iff V(q~, w~ - 1 for all w' E W U W~ such
that wRw'.
Note that the value of a complex formula in an impossible world can be
completely arbitrary. The value of a complex formula does not depend on
the values of its parts. Note also that Rantala models clearly generalize
Kripke models: a Kripke model simply is a Rantala model with empty
W'k.
A formula ~ is said to follow from a formula cp if V(cp, w) - 1 implies
V(~, w) - 1 in each Rantala model (W, W~`, R, V) and w E W. A formula cp
is valid in a Rantala model if V(cp, w) - 1 in each w E W. A formula cp is
valid simpliciter if it is valid in each Rantala model. Formulae q~ and zp
are equivalent iff q~ follows from ~ and ~ follows from q~. Clearly, all
propositional tautologies are valid, but Necessitation fails: validity of cp
dces not imply validity of O q~. Given the epistemic interpretation of 0
this is as it should be: one may well fail to know that a sentence is true
even if it is valid. Also the K schema fails: write cp -~ ~ for ~(q~ n~y~),
then t] (q~ ~~) --~ (~ q~ ~(] y~) is not valid. This is also as desired, since
knowledge is not closed under modus ponens. The notion of validity just
defined is indeed a minimal one: with the help of standard techniques it is
easily shown that a sentence is valid if and only if it is a substitution in-
stance of a propositional tautology.
Equivalent sentences need not be interchangeable in this system. For
instance, p and ~~p are equivalent, but a model in which ~p and O~~p
are assigned different truth values in some possible world is easily con-
structed. The system thus meets the requirement discussed in the previous
section.
Wansing [1990] shows that a number of formalisms that have arisen in
AI research can in fact be subsumed under the impossible worlds ap-
proach. He proves in some detail that the knowledge and belief structures
that were proposed in Levesque [1984], Vardi [1986], Fagin 8r Halpern
[1988] and Van der Hcek 8c Meyer [1988] can be reduced to non-normal
worlds models. Thijsse [1992] on the other hand proves that Rantala
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models can be reduced to the models of Fagin 8t Halpern [1988] (if the
latter are slightly generalised) and thus, using Wansing's result, obtains
equivalence between Rantala semantics and Fagin ác Halpern's logic of
general awareness.
The system is elegant enough, generalises Kripke's semantics for
modal logic and subsumes other approaches to the logic of the proposi-
tional attitudes, then what are my qualms? Here is one. We have just de-
fined the implication q~ -~ z~ with the help of ~ and n. Alternatively, we
could have introduced the arrow as a primitive, imposing the extra con-
straint that for all models (W, W~, R, V) and for all w E W:
(ii') V(q~ ~~, w) - 0 iff V(cp, w) - 1 and V(~, w) - 0.
But the two methods lead to different results. For even while the formulae
cp -~ ~ and cp ~ y~ are equivalent, they are not interchangeable in all con-
texts: (] (q~ -~ z~) and (] (cp ~ y~) may have different truth values in some
possible world. The addition of ~ to the language and the addition of
clause (ii') to the definition of a Rantala model really added to the logic's
expressive power. Two Rantala models may validate exactly the same
sentences of the original language, yet may differ on sentences of the new
language.
This means that functional completeness fails for Rantala's system.
Usually, when setting up a logic, we can contend ourselves with laying
down truth conditions for some functionally complete set of connectives,
e.g. for ~ and n. Adding connectives and letting them correspond to new
truth functions usually does not increase expressive power since all truth
functions are expressible with the help of ~ and n. But in the present case
this is no longer so.
Why? The source of the trouble is that in Rantala models the interpre-
tation of logical constants is not fixed. Even a reduplication of one of the
logical constants would strengthen the system. Let us add a connective 8z
to the system and impose a condition completely analogous to (ii), namely
that for all w E W:
(ii'~ V(q~ 8z ~, w) - 1 iff V(q~, w) - 1 and V(~, w) - 1
The weird result is that t] (rp n ~) is not equivalent with l] (q~ 8~ zp) and
that it is possible now to distinguish between models that were indistin-
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guishable (i.e. validated the same sentences) before. The question arises:
which is the real conjunction, n or 8t?
Is it possible to have a logic if the interpretations of the logical con-
stants are allowed to vary with each model? This question can only be an-
swered if some criterion of logicality is accepted. Such criteria have been
developed within abstract model theory (see Barwise [1974]), a branch of
logic where theorems are proved of the form: "every logic that has such-
and-such properties is so-and-so".4 Rantala [1982b] notes that in fact his
system dces not meet the standards that are usually set here. There is a
problem with renaming. In general the truth value of a formula should not
change if we replace some non-logical constant in it by another constant
which has the same semantic value. In Rantala models this fails, for ex-
ample, it is easy to construct a Rantala model such that V(p, w) - V(q, iv)
for all w E W U W~` but V(D ~p, w) ~ V(D ~q, w) for some possible ~~~orld
w E W. The value of D~p thus may crucially depend on the particular
name that we have chosen for the proposition that is denoted by p.
This may or may not be defensible, but, as I shall show below, the
weird characteristics of Rantala's system are not essential to the idea of
impossible world semantics. The idea can be formalised with the help of a
system that meets all standards of logicality.
The basic intuition behind the introduction of impossible worlds is that,
since we humans are finite and fallible, we fail to rule out worlds which
would be ruled out by a perfect reasoner. What do such worlds look like?
Well, for example, one of Jones' epistemic alternatives was the impossi-
bility that `if A is locked B is not' is true, but that `if B is locked A is not'
is false. For a short time, at least one impossible world in which the first
sentence is true but the second is not was not ruled out by Jones' reason-
ing. But in such worlds the words `not' and `if' cannot get their usual
Boolean interpretation, since this interpretation would simply force the
sentences to be equivalent. We therefore end up with non-standard inter-
pretations for the `logical' words in English: `and' cannot be intersection
of sets of worlds, `or' cannot be union, `not' cannot be complementation
and so on.
4 An example is Lindstrbm's Theorem, which says that for no logic properly
extending first-order predicate logic both the Compactness Theorem and the
I,áwenheim-Skolem Theorem hold.
Rantala formalises this by treating the word `and' as the connective n
but by giving this last symbol a non-logical interpretation. This leads to a
funny system. The obvious alternative is to keep the logic standard but to
formalise the English word `and' and its like as non-logical constants:
once it is accepted that no logical operation strictly corresponds to the
English word `and', the most straightforward solution is be open about it
and to formalise the word with the help of a non-logical constant.
Of course, some connection between the `logical' words in English and
the connectives that usually formalise them should remain intact. What
connection? Even if we allow the interpretations of the `logical' words to
be completely arbitrary, there will be a subset of the set of all worlds
where `and' and its ilk behave standardly. These worlds where the logical
words of English have their usual logical interpretation may be called the
`possible' or `actualizable' ones. As we shall see below, the assumption
that the actual world is actualizable leads to the desired relation of logical
consequence.
But it is high time for a more precise formalisation. In the next section
I give a short sketch of the classical logic that I want to use and in the last
section I'll apply it to the propositional attitude verbs.
3 Classical Type Theory
Since we want to treat `and', `or', `not', `if', `every' and `some' as non-
logical constants, ~ve should use a logic that admits of non-logical con-
stants for these types of expressions. Ordinary predicate logic will not do,
but a logic that is admirably suited to the job is Church's [1940] formula-
tion of Russell's Theory of Types (Russell [1908]). Since I expect that not
all of my readers are familiar with this system, I'll give it a short exposi-
tion (and so readers who already know about the logic can skip this sec-
tion). For a more extensive account one may consult the original papers
(e.g. Church [1940], Henkin [1950, 1963]), Gallin [1975], the survey ar-
ticle Van Benthem Bc Dcets [1983], or the text book Andrews [1986]. In
Muskens [1989a, 1989b, 1989~] some variants of the logic are given, but
I'll follow the standard set-up here.
In classical type theory each logical expression comes with a type.
Types are either basic or complex. The type of truth values, here denoted
with t, should be among the basic types, but there may be other basic
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types as well. In this paper, for example, we'll assume types for individu-
als (type e) and worlds (type s). Complex types are of the form a~ 5 and
an expression of type a~ will denote a function which takes things of type
a to things of type ~. Formally we define:
DEFINITION 1(Types). The set of types is the smallest set such that:
i. all basic types are types,
ii. if a and j3 are types, then (a~) is a type.
DEFINITION 2(Frames). A frame is a set of non-empty sets {Da~
a is a type} such that D~ -{0, 1 } and DQ~C {j ~ j: DQ --~ D~ } for all
complex types a~ .
The sets DQ will function as the domains of all things of type a. Note that
we do not require domains Da~ to consist of all functions of the correct
type, as this would make the logic essentially higher-order and non-ax-
iomatisable. Let us assume for each type a the existence of denumerably
infinite sets of variables and non-logical constants vARa and CONQ. From
these we can build up terms with the help of lambda abstraction, applica-
tion and the identity symbol.
DEFINITION 3(Terms). Define, for each a, TERMd the set of terms of type
a, b}~ the follo~ving inductive definition:
i. CONQ CTERMQ;
VARQ CTERMQ;
ii. A E TERMQ~ , B E TERMa ~(AB) E TERM~ ;
iii. A E TERM~ , x E VARa ~ ílx(A) E TERMa~ ;
iv. A, B E TERMQ ~(A - B) E TERIvir .
If A E TERMQ we may indicate this by writing A~,. Terms of type t are
called formulae. We obtain most of the usual logical signs by means of
abbreviations.
DEFINITION 4 (Abbreviations).
T abbreviates Ax,(x,) - ~lx,(x~)
b~xQrp abbreviates ilxaq~ -1Lra T




q~ n y~ abbreviates AX~tt~ ((X T)T) - íLYun~ (( Xq~)z~)
The rest of the usual logical constants can be got in an obvious way.
In order to assign each term a value in a given frame, we must interpret
all variables and non-logical constants in that frame. An interpretation
function 1 for a frame F- {DQ}Qis a funetion with the set of non-logical
constants as its domain, such that I(c) E Da for each constant c of type a.
Likewise, an assignment a for a frame {Da}Q is a function that has the set
of all variables for its domain, such Ihat a(x) E D~, for each variable x of
type a. If a is an assignment, then a[d ~ x] is defined by
a[dI x](x) - d and
a[dI x](y) - a(y) for y~ x.
A very general model is a tuple (F, ~ consisting of a frame F and an in-
terpretation function 1 for that frame. Given some very general model and
an assignment, we can give each term a value.
DEFINITION 5(Tarski Definition). The value IIAIIM'nof a term A on a very
general model M-({DQ}Q,1) under an assignment a for {DQ}Q is defined
as follows (to improve readability I write IIA II or IIAIIafor IIAIIM.a):
~. II~II -1(c) if c is a constant;
IIxII - a(x) if x is a variable;
ii. IIA~F3~I - I~I(IIBI~) lf IIBII E domain(IIAII)
- ~S otherwise;
iii. IIi1.x~IIa- the function f with domain DQ such that for all d E
DQ:.Ír~ - IIA II a[d~sj ;
iv. IIA - BII -1 iff IIAII - IIBII.
We define a (general) model to be a very general model M-({Da}Q,1)
such thatIIAQIIM.a E Da for every term AQ and we restrict our attention to
general models. Note that in general models the second subclause of ii.
does not apply (we needed it for the correctness of definition 5). The
reader may verify that on general models the logical constants T, b~,1, ~
and n get their usual (classical) interpretations.
The semantic notion of entailment is defined as follows.
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DEFINITION 6(Entailment). Let T U{q~ } be a set of formulae. Tentails cQ,
I' ~- y~, if, for all models M and assignments a to M, ~~~~~M~ a- 1 for all ~
E Timplies ~~q~~M n- 1.
Henkin [1950] has proved that it is possible to axiomatise the logic. In
fact, an elegant set of four axiom schemes and one derivation rule will do
the job. For details see the literature mentioned above. For the present
purposes it suffices to note that ~ conversion and rl- conversion hold and
that we can reason with - and the defined constants T, t1,1, ~ and n as in
(many-sorted) classical predicate logic with identity.
4 Classical Logic Without Logical Omniscience
Let us apply our logic to English.b Since we have decided to treat the
`logical' words as non-logical constants, we can now uniformly treat all
words as such. Table 1 below gives a list of all constants that we shall use
in this paper, most of them named in a way that makes it easy to see
which words they are supposed to formalise (the others will not directly
translate words of English; their use will become apparent below). The
constants in the first column of the table have types as indicated in the
second column.
The idea behind the type assignment' is that the meaning of a sentence,
a proposition, is a function that gives us a truth value in each world (and
thus it is a function of type st), that the meaning of a predicate like
planet is a function that gives a truth value if we feed it an individual
and a world (type e(st)) and that an expression that expects an expression
of type a should be of type a~ if the result of combining it with such an
expression should be of type ~. So, for example, not is of type (st)(st)
since it expects a proposition in order to form another proposition with it;
the name mary gives a sentence if it is followed by a predicate and may
therefore be assigned type (e(st))(st).
6 The application of type logic to the formalisation of English discussed in this section
beneficed greatly from Montague [1970a, 1970b, 1973J. In fact we can think of it as a
streamlined form of Montague semantics.

























Some easy calculation shows that the following are terms of type st.
(8) (some woman)walk
(9) (no man)talk
(10) hesperus (is (a planet))
(11) (if((some woman)walk))((no man)talk)
(12) (if((some man)talk))((no woman)walk)
(13) mary(believe((if((some woman)walk))((no man)talk))
(14) mary(believe((if((some man)talk))((no woman)walk))
Clearly, these terms bear a very close resemblance to the sentences of
English that they formalise. For example, the structure of (13) is isomor-
phic or virtually isomorphic to the structure that most linguists would at-
tach to the sentence `Mary believes that if some woman is walking no
man is talking'. But it should be kept in mind that these are terms of the
logic and can be subject to logical manipulation.
We must of course make a connection between at least some of the
non-logical constants that we have just introduced and the logical con-
stants of the system. For example, (11) should be equivalent with (12), but
as matters stand these two terms could denote two completely different
(characteristic functions of) sets of worlds. Up to now, we have allo~~~ed
the interpretations of the constants not, and, or, if and the like to be
completely arbitrary, but it is not unreasonable to assume that at least in
the actual world, which we denote with the constant i, these interpreta-
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tions are standard. In order to ensure this we impose the following non-
logical axioms.e
A1 dp((notp)i H ~pi)
A2 bpq(((andp)q)i N(pi n qi))
A3 ~dpq(((orp)q)i N (pi v qi))
A4 `dpq(((ifp)q)i H (pi -~ qi))
AS tJP,P2(((everyP,)P~i y `dx((P~r)i -~ (PZZ)i))
A6 btP,P2((íaP!)Pz)i `~ 3x(íPrx)i n (PzC)i))
A7 HP,PZ(((someP,)P~i y 3x((P,x)i n(PZx)i))
A8 btP,P2(((noP,)P2)i H ~3x((Prx)i n (P7r)i))
A9 dQbx(((isQ)x)i H (Q~.y~,j(x-y))i)
A10 `dP((hesperusP)i H (P h)i)
`dP((phosphorusP)i H (P p)i)
`dP((maryP)i H (P m)i).
These axioms tell us that an expression notp is true in the actual world i
if and only if p is false in i, that (andp)q is true in i if and only if p and q
are both true in i, and so on. Given these axioms many sentences get their
usual truth value in the actual world. For example A7 tells us that ((some
woman)walk)i and 3x~((womanx)i n(walkx)i) are equivalent, A8 says
that ((no man)talk)i is equivalent with ~3x((manx)i n(talkx)i).
Axiom A10 says that there is an individual h such that the quantifier
hesperus holds of some predicate at i if and only if that predicate holds
of h at i. We can use the axioms to see that the following terms are
equivalent.
hesperus (is (a planet))i
((is (a planet))h)i (A10)
((a planet)~,y~,j(h -y))i (A9)
3r((planetx)i n (~lyíl,j(h -y)x)i) (A6)
3x((planetx)i n h- x) (~ reduction twice)
(planet h)i (predicate logic)
8 Here and in the rest of the paper I shall letj and k be type s variables; x and y type e
variables; (subscripted) P a variable of type e(st); Q a type (e(st))(st) variable; and p and
q variables of type st. Variables are in Times italic, constants in Courier.
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Let ~ be the conjunction of our finite set of axioms and let [k I i] ~ be the
result of substituting the type s variable k for each occurrence of i in fi.
The st term Ak [k I i]~ denotes the set of those worlds in which not,
and, or, if etc. have their standard logical meaning. We may view the
term ílk [k I i] ~ as formalising the predicate `is logically possible' or `is
actualizable'. The axioms thus express that the actual world is logically
possible or actualizable.
We define a notion of entailment on st terms with the help of the set of
axioms AX -{A1,..., A12} (All and A12 will be given shortly). An ar-
gument is (weakly) valid if and only if the conclusion is true in the actual
world if all premises are true in the actual world, assuming that the actual
world is actualizable.
DEFINITION 7(Weak entailment). Let q~,, ...,g~~, z~ be terms of type st.
We say that ~ follows from y~,, .. .,q~n if AX, q~,i, ...,cp~i ~~i. Terms
cp and y~ of type st are called equivalent if ~ follo~~s from q~ and cp follows
from zj~.
That terms (11) and (12) are indeed equivalent in this sense can easily be
seen now. The following terms are equivalent.
((if((some woman)walk))((no man)talk))i
((some woman)walk)i -~ ((no man)talk)i (A4)
3x((womanx)i n (walkx)i) --~ ((no man)talk)i (A7)
3x((womanx)i n (walkx)i) -~ ~3x((marix)i n (talkx)i) (A8)
In the same way we find that (12) applied to i is equivalent with
3x((manx)i n (talkx)i) -~ ~3x((womanx)i n (walkx)i),
and the equivalence of (11) and (12) follows with contraposition.
But if we try to apply a similar procedure to (13) and (14) the process
quickly aborts. It is true that (13) applied to i with the help of A10 can be
reduced to
((believe((if((some woman)walk))((no man)talk)))m)i
and that (14) applied to i can be reduced to
14
((believe((if((some man)talk))((no woman)walk))hn)i
but further reductions are not possible. In fact it is not difficult to find a
model in which one of these formulae is true but the other is false. The
reason is that it is not only the denotation in the actual world of the em-
bedded terms (11) and (12) that matters now, but that their full meanings
(i.e. denotations in all possible and impossible worlds) have to be taken
into account. Not only their Bedeutung but also their Sinn. Since no two
syntactically different terms have the same Sinn, no unwanted replace-
ments are allowed.
Note that the solution dces not commit us to a Hintikka style treatment
of knowledge and belief. We have not assumed that belief is truth in all
doxastic alternatives, knowledge truth in all epistemic alternatives. But we
can, if we wish, make these assumptions by adopting the following two
axioms.
Al l b~p`dx(((believep)x)i ~--~ b`j(((Bx)i)j -~ p~))
A12 Hp`dx(((knowp)x)i H Hj(((Kx)i)j -~ p~))
Here B and K are constants of type e(s(st)) that stand for the doxastic and
epistemic alternative relations respectively. A term ((Bx)i)j can be read as:
`in world i, world j is a doxastic alternative of x ' or `in world i, world j is
compatible with the beliefs of x'; ((Kx)i)j can be read as: `in world i,
world j is an epistemic alternative of x' or `in world i, world j is compat-
ible with the knowledge of x'.9 If these axioms are accepted, we can re-
duce (13) to
Hj(((Bm)i)j -~ ((if((some woman)walk))((no man)talk))~),
9 We may demand that B and K satisfy some axioms. The followi~ig seem a reasonable
choice:
Hx((xx)i)i
VxVjk(((~)i)1 ~ (((~)Í )k ~ ((~)i)k))
Hx3j((Hx)i)j
b~xb~jk(((Bx)i)Í -~ (((Bx)j)k N ((Bx)i)k))
Hx`dj(((Bx)i)j -' ((Rx)i)j)
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a formula that expresses that (11) holds in all Mary's doxastic alterna-
tives. Clearly, no further reductions are possible and we can still find
models such that (13) is true but (14) is false (in the actual world).
The mechanism helps us to solve some related puzzles as well. For ex-
ample, (17) should not follow from (15) and (16) and it dcesn't.
(15) hesperus (is phosphorus)
(16) (every man)(know(hesperus(is hesperus)))
(17) (every man)(know(phosphorus(is hesperus)))
Surely, (hesperus (is phosphorus))i reduces to h- p after a few
steps, and h and p are thus interchangeable in all contexts if (15) is ac-
cepted, but (16), if it is applied to i, only reduces to
(18) `dx((manx)i --~ b~j(((Kx)i)j -~ (hesperus ( is hespe-
rus))~)),
and (17) applied to i can only be reduced to
(19) ~dx((manx)i -~ b~j(((Kx)i)j --~ (phosphorus (is hespe-
rus))~)).
Clearly, the premise h- p and (18) do not entail (19).
Terms (16) and (17) are the de dicto readings of the sentences `Every
man knows that Hesperus is Hesperus' and `Every man knows that
Phosphorus is Hesperus' respectively. Of course, we can also formalise de
re readings, as is illustrated in (20) and (21). The reading that is for-
malised by (20) can be paraphrased as `Of Hesperus, every man knows
that it is Hesperus', while the other term can be paraphrased as `Of
Phosphorus, every man knows that it is Hesperus'. The reader may wish
to verify that in this case the relevant entailment holds: (21) follows from
(20) and (15).
(20) hesperusílr((every man)(know((is hesperus)x)))
(21) phosphorusíl.x((every man)(know((is hesperus)x)))
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This possibility of quantifying-in, which the present theory shares with
other semantic theories of the attitudes, distinguishes the approach from
Quine's [1966] syntactic treatment. But our semantic theory is as fine-
grained as any syntactic theory can be, for no two syntactically different
expressions have the same meaning. The resemblance between the syn-
tactic approach and ours is close: the syntactic theory treats the attitudes
as relations between persons and syntactic expressions, we treat them as
relations between persons and the meanings of those expressions. But
since different expressions have different meanings, this boils down to
much the same thing.
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